• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados. Introduction G lobal History has become a rising star in historical studies. Yet its popularity has not been followed by a consensus on what it means. Some scholars understand Global History as an object of study, focusing on the history of global or transnational issues, such as the environment, oceans, migrations, exchanges, and processes linked to globalization. Others understand it as a method, delving into comparative studies; interactions among local, national, regional, and international units of analyses; or, as Conrad (2015, 67) put it, on how to frame "the problem of causation up to the global level." There are also those who criticize Global History for being "another Anglospheric invention to integrate the Other into a cosmopolitan narrative on our terms, in our tongues" (Adelman 2017). 1 Even if the possibilities opened up by Global History have been exaggerated, a promising venue involves understanding phenomena that have been overlooked or interpreted through Western-oriented 1 There are many accounts on the meanings of Global History. For a recent compilation, see Darton and Motadel (2018).
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lobal History has become a rising star in historical studies. Yet its popularity has not been followed by a consensus on what it means. Some scholars understand Global History as an object of study, focusing on the history of global or transnational issues, such as the environment, oceans, migrations, exchanges, and processes linked to globalization. Others understand it as a method, delving into comparative studies; interactions among local, national, regional, and international units of analyses; or, as Conrad (2015, 67) put it, on how to frame "the problem of causation up to the global level." There are also those who criticize Global History for being "another Anglospheric invention to integrate the Other into a cosmopolitan narrative on our terms, in our tongues" (Adelman 2017) . 1 Even if the possibilities opened up by Global History have been exaggerated, a promising venue involves understanding phenomena that have been overlooked or interpreted through Western-oriented Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 61(2): e003, 2018 Loureiro; Gomes Jr.; Braga 3 strong political implications: at the time Latin American countries had to determine on their own how to deal with Cuba. The fact that they denied Cuba's membership is significant, especially because the LAFTA Charter -the 1960 Treaty of Montevideo -stated that the association should be open to all Latin American countries. The episode is also meaningful because Brazil did not support Cuba's rights the same way it had done at Punta del Este, exposing the limits of the country's so-called Independent Foreign Policy (Política Externa Independente (PEI)).
Second, even though LAFTA ultimately failed to create a Latin American free trade area, initially many hoped that it would succeed. Had Cuba been accepted into LAFTA in August 1962, it would have represented a clear move against the U.S. trade embargo. This was consistent with Brazil's arguments at the 1962 Punta del Este Conference. According to Itamaraty (Brazil's Foreign Office), keeping ties with Cuba would avoid pushing the country further toward Moscow. The lack of multilateral channels for negotiating with Cuba in the Americas during the October 1962 Missile Crisis was a by-product of the decision to deny Cuba's access to LAFTA, even though bilateral channels, especially with Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, remained open (Hershberg 2004a; 2004b; .
Finally, the case is important because of its long-term implications. After having been denied LAFTA membership, Cuba remained outside of inter-American initiatives until 1975, when the country joined the Latin American Economic System (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA)) (Domínguez 1989; Reed 1979 ). However, it was only in 1999 that Havana ratified the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo, which established LAFTA's current successor -the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). Cuba's openness to engage with multilateral organizations in the hemisphere was confined to institutions in which the U.S. was not a member. Although the OAS voted to lift sanctions against Cuba in 1975, Havana stated that it did not have the intention to join the OAS again (Erisman 1985) . Only when Raúl Castro came to power in 2008 (alongside the shift in U.S. foreign policy under Barack Obama) that conditions for Cuba's readmission to the OAS were met, resulting, in 2009, in the cancellation of the 1962 Punta del Este Resolution that banned Cuba from the organization. 5 Therefore, Latin America's decision to keep Cuba out of LAFTA contributed to the extension and solidification of Cold War divisions in the Americas (Smith 2000) .
This article seeks to understand why Latin American countries decided to block Cuba's membership in LAFTA in mid-1962. Employing mainly U.S. and Brazilian official documents, we propose a three-step argument. First, the crucial factor was Argentina's radical opposition to Cuba, a key difference from the January 1962 Punta del Este Conference, when Argentina had followed Brazil's lead and supported Cuba's right to self-determination. Second, even though the U.S. exerted indirect influence on Latin American countries, the Kennedy administration did not play a central role in the matter, letting Latin American Cold Warriors, especially Argentina, do the job on its behalf. Finally, Brazil changed its position not because it dreaded cuts to U.S. foreign aid, as Salvador Rivera (2014) argues, but because it took Argentinean threats seriously and feared to undermine the regional integration effort. (Ecuador and Colombia joined in 1961; Venezuela, in 1966; and Bolivia, in 1967) . 6 The organization grew out of negotiations between Argentina and Brazil in the late 1950s. Their primary objective was to circumvent GATT pressure to terminate bilateral trade agreements by setting up a multilateral trade association. 7 Chile and Uruguay joined the project for similar reasons. These four countries accounted for 80% of Latin America's intraregional trade in 1960 (Milenky 1973) .
Pragmatic motivations were followed by an ambitious development project. ECLA members envisioned the Argentine-Brazilian initiative as a springboard for a larger free trade area, spurring Latin American development through trade creation and industrialization. As a result, all Latin American countries were given the right to access LAFTA. Article 58 of the Treaty of Montevideo established that the organization should "remain open for the adhesion of the remaining Latin American states," provided that they deposited "the corresponding Adhesion Instrument" with the Uruguayan government. 8 Therefore, LAFTA membership represented a unilateral decision.
Even though LAFTA did not live up to its most optimistic expectations, the project was not a complete failure. Brazil's exports to Latin America grew two times faster in the 1960s than the country's total exports to the world in the same period; in Argentina, the expansion was even more dramatic -three times faster (Porcile 1995) . This increase was due to tariff cuts negotiated on a yearly basis at LAFTA meetings (Porcile 1995; Romano 2008) . Not only did LAFTA serve to protect previous bilateral trade agreements from GATT intrusions, but it also stimulated trade, and became a tool for regional development.
The promising start of LAFTA prompted Colombia and Ecuador to join it in 1961. Even Cuba explored the possibility as early as August 1961. 9 However, a few important factors stood in the way. These included the Cuban Revolution of January 1959, Havana's increasing links with the Soviet Union, and Fidel Castro's backing for hemispheric revolution -all of which brought 6 Unless otherwise referenced, information on LAFTA was based on Dabène (2009 ), Grien (1994 , Milenky (1973) , Rivera (2014) , and Romano (2008) . 7 The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) banned bilateral trade preferences. Free trade areas were exempted from the most-favored-nation clause though (Milenky 1973,) . 8 For the Treaty of Montevideo, see https://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/DataEIAs2006/FTA5yrData_files/PDF%20Files/Latin%20America/ LAFTA%20-%20MONTEVIDEO%20TREATY%20(1960)%20(English).pdf 9 ALALC: amanhã, o início das negociações sobre as tarifas (1961, 37) ; Cuba quer ingressar na ALALC (1961, 9).
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Loureiro; Gomes Jr.; Braga 5 the Cold War to the Americas more strongly than ever. Washington became extremely concerned with the prospect of having a Soviet springboard and Communist showcase in the hemisphere and moved swiftly to resist it (Schoultz 2009; Taffet 2014) . Some Latin American governments, particularly those most affected by Cuban revolutionary activities and propaganda, such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, Colombia and Venezuela, also pursued an anti-Castro agenda (Keller 2015) . Others, however, especially the largest Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), were not in favor of a confrontational approach. Brazil's foreign policy during the Jânio Quadros and João Goulart administrations (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) -the Independent Foreign Policy-represented the most compelling example of this perspective (Storrs 1973; Loureiro et al. 2015) .
Brazilian officials, particularly those at Itamaraty, argued that normative and policy considerations justified a moderate stand on Cuba. On the normative side, they defended the principles of non-intervention and self-determination. Countries should respect each other's sovereignty by not intervening in domestic affairs and by accepting different forms of social and economic organization. On the policy side, Brazilian officials argued that isolating Havana was not the best way to deal with the Cuban challenge, as it would only push Cuba even more into the Communist bloc (Storrs 1973) .
The split between countries that defended tougher vs. softer measures on Cuba became clear during the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics in Uruguay in January 1962. Following the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Tiar), Colombia proposed holding the Punta del Este Conference to "consider the threats to the peace and to the political independence of the American states that might arise from the intervention of extracontinental powers" -in this case, Soviet intervention in the Americas through Cuba. 10 Despite strong U.S. pressure, Brazil led a group of large and medium Latin American nations (Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia) against Cuba's expulsion from the OAS. Brazil's Foreign Minister, San Tiago Dantas, proposed the neutralization of Cuba instead: American countries should accept Havana's socialist order, provided that Cuba severs ties with the Communist bloc and halt revolutionary rhetoric and activities in Latin America (Franchini Neto 2005; Leacock 1990; Weis 2001) . No compromise was reached. Instead, Cuba was expelled from the OAS, albeit with the minimum number of votes. The largest Latin American countries abstained, which represented a significant defeat for Washington.
The 1962 Punta del Este Conference sent shockwaves across Latin America. In Brazil, an anti-Communist parliamentary coalition carried out a campaign against the Brazilian foreign policy (Weis 2001) . In Ecuador and Argentina, political developments were more decisive, leading to democratic breakdowns. Right after the Conference, the predominantly anti-Communist Argentinean and Ecuadorian military forces compelled presidents Arturo Frondizi and Carlos Julio Arosemena to cut diplomatic relations with Cuba. Eventually, the military decided to remove both presidents Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 61(2): e003, 2018
Loureiro; Gomes Jr.; Braga 6 from office. In late March 1962, Frondizi was forced out of power and the president of the country's Senate, José Maria Guido (a military-controlled figurehead), took his place (Sheinin 2006 ). In July 1962, Arosemena faced the same destiny, being replaced by a military junta (Epps 2009 ).
The backlash of the 1962 Punta del Este Conference brought serious challenges to the implementation of Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy in hemispheric fora, including those in which the U.S. was not a member, such as LAFTA. This was particularly true when it came to Brasília's relationship with Buenos Aires. LAFTA depended on solid relations between Brazil and Argentina. Brazilian officials were aware that divergences with Argentina could destroy LAFTA and harm Brazil's interests in South America. 11 Itamaraty wished to maintain the same relations with Cuba, but the conditions that had allowed a Brazilian-led coalition at Punta del Este in defense of Havana's right to self-determination had been dismantled after the March 1962 coup in Argentina. Exactly in this context, Cuba decided to challenge the OAS decision by attempting to join LAFTA.
Explaining the Crisis: Cuba's Failed Attempt to Join LAFTA
Less than two months after the Punta del Este Conference, Cuban representatives approached LAFTA's Executive Secretary, Brazilian economist Rômulo de Almeida, and asked about the application process to the free trade area. Two weeks later, in mid-April 1962, Almeida learned that Cuba had set up a study group. The Brazilian Ambassador to LAFTA, Gerson Silva, concluded that this represented a strong indication that Cuba was determined to become LAFTA's tenth member. 12 At this point, Brazil was probably the only country that knew how serious Cuba's intentions were. The Brazilian delegation to LAFTA tried to invite Cuba to the Second Conference of the Contracting Parties, scheduled for August 1962 in Mexico City. Five members rejected the proposal -Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru. 13 Other Latin American countries had been invited as observers, including Anastasio Somoza's Nicaragua, which confirms that Cuba was singled out as an excluded party. 14 The crisis within LAFTA broke out in mid-August 1962, just one week before the opening of the Mexico City Conference: on August 17, Havana deposited the instruments of ratification for the Treaty of Montevideo with the Uruguayan government. This suggests that Cuba was trying to enhance its security not only by allying with the Soviet Union and instigating revolutionary uprisings in the hemisphere -as scholars emphasize -, but also by diversifying and strengthening links with Latin American governments (Domínguez 1989; Erisman 1985 14 Latin Trade Unit Set to Block Cuba. (1962, 48) . 15 Gleijeses (2003) argues that Cuba's stimulus to revolution in the Americas was more rhetorical than real in the 1961-1962 period.
Rev
Cuba's move took many by surprise. Despite alleged intentions to join the association, few expected the country to do so, especially after Fidel Castro's February 1962 radical encouragement of hemispheric revolution following Cuban expulsion from the OAS (Erisman 1985) . 16 In private, all participants recognized that Cuba's application to join LAFTA was indisputable on legal grounds. 17 However, the association's anti-Communist members were adamantly opposed to it. Given that denying Cuba's application required the passing of a resolution without opposing votes, LAFTA was about to face a serious institutional crisis.
The Kennedy administration immediately understood the gravity of the matter and rushed to push Latin America into blocking Havana's move. 18 Washington officials were aware that Brazil's stance would be crucial for deciding Cuba's future. The U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro swiftly followed through on Secretary Rusk's order, but the results were not encouraging. Political Counselor Robert Eakens met with the Brazilian official responsible for LAFTA matters in Itamaraty, Ambassador Henrique Valle. Valle made clear to Eakens that the Brazilian government would follow legal guidelines, supporting Cuba's right to membership. When Eakens mentioned that LAFTA was part of the inter-American system, indirectly suggesting that U.S. money could not be provided to organizations that included Cuba as a member, the Brazilian diplomat did not seem worried. Valle responded that "the U.S. was already cool toward the idea" of providing funds to LAFTA, meaning that U.S. threats did not yet concern Brazil. Valle further argued that the best thing to do was to handle Cuba's application with "indifference," as "nothing would come out" of it due to "technical and practical problems arising from [the] inconsistency [of the] Cuban system with [the] free trade concept." 19 Even more important than the Brazilian perspective was the Uruguayan position, at least during the first days of the crisis. If Montevideo formally recognized Havana's deposit of the instruments of ratification, Brazilian intentions would no longer be relevant. Surprisingly, however, the U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay, Wymberley Coerr, argued for a low profile attitude. In response 16 A swift and decisive Argentinean reaction forestalled Uruguay's legalist intentions. On August 22, Buenos Aires presented a strong protest to the Uruguayan government. According to accounts from the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, the Argentinean Ambassador in Montevideo argued to Uruguayan officials that five out of nine LAFTA members (Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru) were completely against Cuba's adherence to the association, and that Uruguay could not recognize Havana's act before the LAFTA Conference in Mexico City. Montevideo backed down the same day, postponing the recognition for one week -by August 29 -, which suggests that Argentina's pressure paid off. 23 Buenos Aires achieved its primary objective: to buy time prior to the opening of the Mexico City Conference. The path was clear for transforming what was originally a unilateral legal act into a multilateral decision.
The Mexico City Conference was meant to be the second big opportunity for LAFTA members to negotiate tariff concessions. Brazilian entrepreneurs, particularly those in the manufacturing sector, had been preparing themselves for this meeting for months. 24 Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 61(2): e003, 2018
Loureiro; Gomes Jr.; Braga 9 problem took precedence over anything else. 25 Argentina led a coalition of four LAFTA countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru) supporting an amendment to the Treaty of Montevideo. Buenos Aires claimed that new participants could only be accepted in the organization upon the approval of two thirds of the members. 26 Brazil and Mexico did not agree and wanted to follow the legal rules. They argued that it was better to limit rather than deny Cuba's participation in LAFTA. Chile and Uruguay began supporting the legalist position, but very quickly moved to the Argentinean side. U.S. officials understood that this had occurred mainly because of pressure from Buenos Aires. 27 During the Conference, Argentina sent a request to Montevideo, supported by its four backers plus Chile, asking for an indefinite postponement of the recognition of the Cuban deposit. The Uruguayan government acquiesced. 28 Now Cuba's adherence depended on the decisions that would be made at the Mexico City Conference. The impasse endured as amendments to the Treaty of Montevideo and LAFTA resolutions had to be approved without opposing votes. This meant that Brazil and Mexico held veto power over the Argentinean proposal. 29 On the opening day of the Conference in Mexico, the State Department reauthorized U.S. representatives in LAFTA countries to press against Cuba's membership to the free trade area. 33 On the following day, Mexican newspapers reported that LAFTA was in danger and faced "one of its gravest problems." 34 Coincidentally, after Argentina threatened to destroy LAFTA, Brazil stepped back. A compromise was reached on how to prevent Cuba's accession to the association. Itamaraty was against amending the Treaty of Montevideo, so a commission of four jurists was set up to draft resolutions. 35 The commission elaborated two resolutions: the first stated that countries whose economic regimes were incompatible with the principles of the Treaty of Montevideo could not have their instruments of ratification accepted; the second affirmed that Cuba's economic system was incompatible with LAFTA. It also established that as long as the Communist regime persisted, Havana could not join the association. 36 Once Brazil decided not to use its veto power, Mexico stood alone in defending Cuba's rights, though only for a short time. 37 As the only non-South American LAFTA member, Mexico had never had the same level of involvement with the free trade area. Soon the Mexican government gave up on Cuba as well. On September 3, with seven votes in favor and two abstentions (from Brazil and Mexico), the resolutions were approved. Cuba could not join LAFTA. 38 Evidence suggests that the key motive behind Brazil's position was the fear that LAFTA would break up if Argentina's stance were not accepted. Right after Cuba's membership had been denied, the head of the Brazilian delegation in Mexico City, Henrique Valle, argued that Brazil had abstained "in obedience above all to the spirit of cooperation […] , and in order not to impede the progress of important negotiations which await us." 39 The Brazilian newspaper (Sheinin 2006) . The most extreme elements of the Armed Forces, the so-called reds (colorados), had strengthened their hold on President Guido on the eve of the Cuban application to LAFTA. 48 It was no coincidence that Argentina played a key leadership role during the episode, and it would continue to do so. When the Cuban Missile Crisis broke out in October 1962, Guido's Argentina provided the most enthusiastic response in favor of the U.S.: not only did it back Washington at the OAS and pledge support for the U.S. quarantine, but it quickly followed through with the promise, deploying naval and aerial forces in the Caribbean (Keller 2015; Morgenfeld 2012b) . Post-Frondizi Argentina proved to be an important Cold Warrior in Latin America.
Conclusions
Cuba's attempt to join the Latin American Free Trade Area in August 1962 led to a serious crisis in the region's most ambitious project for economic integration. LAFTA's main leaders, Argentina and Brazil, were on opposite sides. Buenos Aires saw Havana's membership as a serious threat to regional security and sought to stop it at any cost. This meant infringing the Treaty of Montevideo, which unambiguously granted all Latin American nations the right to join LAFTA. Brasília, on the other hand, following the principles of the Independent Foreign Policy, understood that Cuba's right to self-determination and LAFTA rules should be respected and that Havana's adhesion to LAFTA would not negatively impact the organization. In the beginning, Uruguay, Chile, and Mexico shared Brazil's perception. Yet, Argentina prevailed. The association broke its own norms and kept Cuba out. This decision represented a ratification of the January 1962 OAS Punta del Este Conference, excluding Havana from inter-American multilateral fora. However, this time the decision was made by Latin American countries within the framework of a Latin American institution.
Buenos Aires was the key obstacle to Cuba's membership. The Argentinean military, buttressed by March 1962 military coup, reversed the country's foreign policy, carrying out a clear antiCommunist line in inter-American affairs. With indirect U.S. support, Argentina exerted strong and successful pressure on Montevideo, preventing the Uruguayan government from recognizing Havana's deposit of LAFTA's instruments of ratification. The matter was then taken to a LAFTA meeting at Mexico City, transforming what should have been a unilateral act into a multilateral decision. During the meeting, Buenos Aires led a group of five countries that threatened to
